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The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network 
formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade 
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of their own countries and those of their partner countries. We show that if all countries 
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compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitate 
global trade liberalization, emphasizing the fact that unlike in the case of a CU, each 
country signing an FTA can have a new FTA with an outside country without consent 
of other member countries. 
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The network of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) covers most countries in a complex
way. The tendency towards “regionalism,” a movement to form regional trade agreements,
has been steadily growing especially since 1980s (Bhagwati, 1993). Since the Treaty of
Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, European Union
(EU) has been growing with the accession of new members. The North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) starts negotiations with Latin American countries to form a
Free Trade Area of the Americas. Japan has recently signed a free trade agreement (FTA)
with Singapore, and now seeks the possibilities separately with South Korea and Mexico.
The website of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on regionalism provides us with an
excellent introduction to this topic.
Over 200 regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been notiﬁed to the GATT or
WTO over time; currently over 150 agreements are in force, most of which have
been concluded in the past 10 years. Since 1995, over 100 agreements covering
trade in goods or services, or both, have been notiﬁed to the WTO.
The network of RTAs throughout the world is now highly complex and many
countries are members of several agreements, sometimes with diﬀering rules.
Nearly 60 percent of the notiﬁed RTAs in force at the end of 2000 have been
concluded among European countries. RTAs concluded among developing coun-
tries account for about 15 percent of the total. One of the most frequently asked
questions is whether the growth of regional groups helps or hinders the develop-
ment of the WTO’s multilateral trading system.
(the World Trade Organization website http://www.WTO.org)
Whether PTAs serve as “building blocs” or “stumbling blocs” is a central question in
this topic (Bhagwati, 1993). Of course, multilateral trade liberalization eﬀorts and PTA
formation interact with each other.1 However, putting this feature aside for a while, another
important question remains. Will successive PTA formation alone eﬀectively achieve global
1Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998) show in their political economy models that PTA formation hinders
multilateral trade liberalization. Freund (2000b) demonstrates that countries have more incentive to form
PTAs as multilateral trade negotiations lower tariﬀs imposed by every country. See also Bagwell and Staiger
(1997a,b), Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001), and Ethier (1998).
1free trade, or will the process stop prematurely so that the world is divided into several,
mutually exclusive trading blocs? If PTA formation continues until global free trade network
is achieved, we may conclude that PTAs are “building blocs.” But otherwise, PTAs can be
“stumbling blocs.” 2
Ohyama (1972) and Kemp and Wan (1976) demonstrate a positive result for this “dy-
namic” path problem. The so-called Kemp-Wan theorem states that member countries can
appropriately adjust external tariﬀs and make internal transfers so that a newly formed
customs union (CU) is Pareto-improving, not only to members themselves but also to all
countries in the world.3 Continuous application of this Kemp-Wan process implies that the
CU expansion continues until all countries in the world are covered.4 Although the theo-
rem looks promising, it should be taken as an existence theorem (of a Pareto-improving CU
expansion). In reality, it is extraordinarily diﬃcult to adjust external tariﬀs such that each
nonmember country’s welfare is not reduced by the CU formation. Indeed, as Viner (1950)
taught us, adverse trade-diversion eﬀects often prevents PTAs from being Pareto improving.5
It is far from obvious that in reality, countries always have incentives to form PTAs so that
we will eventually observe the complete global free trade network (global free trade). Indeed,
Yi (1996) shows that even if countries are symmetric, the world would be divided into two
CUs of asymmetric size when the number of countries is a realistic number.
CUs are not the only form of PTAs. A PTA can take a form of an FTA, such as NAFTA,
in which member countries choose their individual external tariﬀs without consent of other
member countries unlike in the case of CU where all member countries adopt the same
external tariﬀ schedule.6 An important consequence of this diﬀerence, which seems to be
2Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) raises this “PTA time-path” question. The complete global free trade
network may still be diﬀerent from global free trade attained through multilateral trade negotiations, as
Freund (2000a) demonstrates in a model where ﬁrms incur distribution network costs, for example. The
global free trade network may be more complex and ineﬃcient (“spaghetti bowl” phenomenon) than global
free trade attained through multilateral trade negotiations, as Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) claim.
3See Panagariya and Krishna (2002) for an FTA version of the Kemp-Wan theorem.
4Baldwin (1993) demonstrates that as a regional trading bloc expands, outside countries have more
incentive to join the bloc. Haveman (1996) and Goto and Hamada (1999) conduct interesting simulations
that investigate welfare consequences of CU expansion.
5Krugman (1991b) claims that if a “natural” trading bloc, within which a large share of trade takes place
even in the absence of a PTA, is formed, the gains from trade creation are likely to outweigh the losses
from trade diversion. Deardorﬀ and Stern (1994) show the possibility that the situation where the world is
divided into trading blocs is almost as beneﬁcial as global free trade.
6Richardson (1993), Yi (2000) and Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2002) show that each member
country’s optimal tariﬀs against nonmember countries decline as an FTA expands. See Krugman (1991a)
2overlooked more or less in the literature, is that under an FTA, each member country (or a
subset of member countries) can sign another FTA with outside countries without consent of
other member countries. Whereas in the case of CUs, such as European Union, all member
countries should be involved when an outside country tries to form a PTA with a member
country of a CU. Thus, FTAs are more ﬂexible than CUs: A hub-and-spoke system, for
example, is allowed only under FTAs.7
The main goal of this paper is to investigate whether or not the world-wide movement
toward FTAs continue until the complete global free trade network is attained.8 An FTA may
be added to the current free trade network in the world in various ways, such as expansion
of an FTA, and a hub-and-spoke system where a hub country is involved in multiple FTAs
at the same time. An appropriate way to accommodate such various forms of FTAs is
to model the problem as a network formation game developed by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996).9 Given any FTA conﬁguration in the world, we examine whether or not a pair of
countries have incentives to sign an FTA, and whether or not a country has an incentive
to cut an existing FTA. A network that is immune to such deviations is called (pairwise)
stable (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Then we ask if the complete global free trade network
is stable, and if it is, we further ask if it is a unique one. If the complete global free trade
network is a unique stable network, the world is likely to attain global free trade, building
many bilateral FTAs.10
and Bond and Syropoulos (1996) in the case of CUs.
7Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992) discuss the hub-and-spoke system in the argument about NAFTA.
Mukunoki and Tachi (2001) investigate dynamic formation of bilateral FTAs in a three-country model. See
also Puga and Venables (1997) and Wonnacott (1996)
8Driven by the same motivation, Freund (2000c) builds a model such that each country calls out the
number of countries with which it wants to have FTAs, and shows that global free trade is eﬀectively
attained as a unique Nash equilibrium. However, she seems to assume implicitly that a bilateral FTA
between two countries is made eﬀective as long as one of the countries beneﬁts from an agreement, even if
the other strictly prefers not to sign the agreement. This “open membership” rule (see also Yi, 1996) does
not seem to be appealing for discussions of FTAs. If FTAs require consent from both sides, then we will run
into the multiplicity problem of Nash equilibria (see footnote 17).
9Coalition formation games such as Yi (1996, 2000) is not rich enough to accommodate this complex
feature of FTAs.
10To derive a deﬁnite prediction regarding the time-path to global free trade, we may need to build a
dynamic network formation model with farsightedness. Mukunoki and Tachi (2001) show in a dynamic,
symmetric, three-country model that under a certain parameter values, only one bilateral FTA may be
signed in equilibrium so that global free trade is not attained. As Kennan and Riezman (1990) suggest,
countries in a bilateral FTA may in some cases prefer the current situation to global free trade. Then, each
3In order to ﬁnd stable free trade networks, we need to analyze each country’s incentive to
sign or abandon an FTA. As Krugman (1991b) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) suggest,
the asymmetry of countries is an important factor when we assess countries’ incentives for
FTAs. Viner (1950), on the other hand, suggests that substitutability of commodities traded
internationally is also an important factor. The model of this paper is general enough to
allow us to observe how these factors play a role in countries’ decisions to sign an FTA with
other countries.
We consider the model in which the world consists of n countries that trade a numeraire
good and a continuum of diﬀerentiated industrial commodities. Consumers in all countries
share a common quasi-linear utility function, in which substitutability of industrial com-
modities is parameterized. Countries may be diﬀerent in the market size (population size)
and the size of the industrial good industry (measure of ﬁrms). Each of the diﬀerentiated
industrial commodities is produced by one ﬁrm that belongs to one of n countries. Each
country has a tariﬀ schedule for imported industrial commodities, and an FTA between
countries i and j simply means that countries i and j simultaneously eliminate tariﬀs on
commodities imported from each other.
When the utility function is quasi-linear, social welfare, which is merely a representative
consumer’s utility, can be decomposed into two parts: the consumer’s gross utility and the
(industrial) trade surplus that is deﬁned as export proﬁts minus import payments in the
industrial good sector. An FTA with another country is likely to raise the gross utility,
although the second-best eﬀect (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) may sometimes outweigh the
beneﬁts from tariﬀ reduction.11 On the other hand, the impact on the (industrial) trade
surplus is generally ambiguous, and is often crucial in determining whether or not an FTA
is welfare improving.
The eﬀect on a country’s trade surplus of signing an FTA with another country can be
further decomposed into two: one on the trade surplus between these two countries (the
direct surplus eﬀect) and that on the trade surplus with third countries (the third country
eﬀect). The latter eﬀect is always positive, since the country’s export to third countries
member country may not sign a new bilateral free trade agreement with an outside country since it would
induce an FTA between spoke countries, eﬀectively attaining global free trade, in the future. However,
extending Mukunoki and Tachi’s (2001) analysis to the case of many countries is not an easy task.
11If tariﬀs have been imposed on a large portion of commodities, it may not be welfare-improving to get
rid of tariﬀs for a small portion of commodities since it enlarges distortions between these commodities and
the ones with high tariﬀs.
4is not aﬀected by the FTA, while its imports from them decrease since their commodities
become relatively more expensive after the FTA. In contrast, the sign of the direct surplus
eﬀect depends on the two countries’ characteristics such as the market and industry size,
and the characteristics of their current partners. Let us consider, for example, an FTA
between a highly-industrialized small country and a less-industrialized large country. The
FTA increases trade ﬂows from the former to the latter disproportionately, dramatically
increasing the trade surplus of the small highly-industrialized country and decreasing that of
the large less-industrialized country. The direct surplus eﬀect for the large less-industrialized
country is likely to be negative, and it may outweigh the third country eﬀect. Consequently,
the large less-industrialized country is likely to oppose to sign the FTA.12 If two countries
are similar in their characteristics, however, the direct surplus eﬀects would be small, and
the countries are likely to beneﬁt from signing an FTA.13
The main results of this paper are as follows. When all countries are symmetric in the
market size and the industry size, we show that the global free trade network, a network in
which any pair of countries has an FTA, is pairwise stable (Proposition 1). If commodities
are highly substitutable among themselves, however, there may also be other pairwise stable
networks. It is because the diﬀerence in the number of FTA partners can create a large
diﬀerential in the impacts on the direct surplus, even though all countries are symmetric
in the market size and industry size. Nevertheless, we show that if commodities are not
highly substitutable among themselves, the global free trade network is the unique pairwise
stable network (Proposition 2). If countries are asymmetric, on the other hand, the global
free trade network may not be attained. In a special case where all industrial commodities
are independent from each other, a pair of countries sign an FTA if and only if their in-
dustrialization levels are close to each other (Proposition 3). This proposition implies that
developed countries and less developed countries, for example, respectively form mutually
exclusive trading blocs. We also compare FTAs and CUs as to which of these two regimes
12It is interesting to notice that countries in our model have a view that Krugman (1991b) calls GATT-
think: (1) Exports are good, (2) Imports are bad, (3) and other things being equal, an equal increase in
imports and exports is good. Our model gives an economic reasoning to this “enlightened mercantilism,” as
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) does in a model that examines the economic role of the GATT/WTO principles
of reciprocity and nondiscrimination.
13Our assumption of market segmentation is not critical for this result. Furusawa and Konishi (2002)
shows that even in a competitive market economy (with integrated markets), similar countries tend to sign
an FTA since the direct surplus eﬀect is small relative to the positive third country eﬀect that is nothing
but an improvement in the terms of trade with third countries.
5facilitate global trade liberalization. We ﬁnd that if all countries are symmetric, and if in-
dustrial commodities are not highly substitutable among themselves, a pair of countries have
less incentive to form a new FTA if either of them is a member of a CU as opposed to an FTA
(Proposition 4). If countries are asymmetric, on the other hand, the CU formation averages
out member countries’ industrialization levels, which may help further PTA formation. We
illustrate this possibility in the case of mutually independent industrial commodities.
An independent work by Goyal and Joshi (2001) also investigates the FTA formation as a
network formation game, and obtains the result that the complete global free trade network
is pairwise stable. The main part of their analysis assumes that all countries are symmetric
in the (Cournot-oligopolistic) market size and the number of domestic ﬁrms. Our model is
richer in many aspects, enabling us to obtain insights on incentives to sign FTAs, especially
in the case of asymmetric countries. We also discuss the diﬀerence between FTAs and CUs
as we have brieﬂy described above.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive the mar-
ket equilibrium in the presence of tariﬀs. Then, we propose a convenient way to decompose
a country’s social welfare, which plays an important role in the subsequent analysis. We
also derive the optimal tariﬀ. In Section 3, we analyze a country’s incentive to sign an FTA,
and then derive our main results about stable networks both in the symmetric country and
asymmetric country cases. Section 4 compares FTAs and CUs as to which of these enhances
the PTA formation. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
Let N be the set of n countries (n ≥ 2), each of which is populated by a continuum of identical
consumers who consume a numeraire good and a continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated
commodities that are indexed by ω ∈ [0,1]. A diﬀerentiated commodity can be considered
as a variety of an industrial good. Each industrial commodity ω is produced by one ﬁrm
which is also indexed by the same ω. We assume that there is no entry of ﬁrms into this
industry. Each ﬁrm is owned equally by all domestic consumers who receive equal shares of
all ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The numeraire good is produced competitively, on the other hand. Each
consumer is endowed with l units of labor, which is used for production of the industrial and
6numeraire goods. Each unit of labor produces one unit of the numeraire good, so that the
wage rate equals 1. We also assume that industrial commodities are produced with a linear
technology, and normalize the unit labor requirement to be equal to 0 for each industrial
commodity, without loss of generality. Alternatively, we can interpret the model such that
each consumer is endowed with l units of the numeraire good, which can be transformed by
a linear technology into industrial commodities.
In country i (i = 1,2,···,n), measure µi of consumers and measure si of ﬁrms that
produce industrial commodities are located. Thus, country i produces si industrial com-
modities, which are consumed in every country in the world. We assume that the markets
are segmented so that ﬁrms can perfectly price discriminate among diﬀerent countries. We
normalize the size of total population so that
Pn
k=1 µk = 1 as well as
Pn
k=1 sk = 1. The
ratio θi ≡ si/µi measures country i’s industrialization level. The higher the ratio, the higher
the country’s industrialization level. This ratio plays an important role later in our analysis.
Country i imposes a speciﬁc tariﬀ at a rate of ti
j on the imports of the industrial commodities
that are produced in country j. For simplicity, we assume that every commodity produced
in country j faces the same tariﬀ rate ti
j.14 We assume that there is no commodity tax, so
that ti
i = 0. We also assume that the countries do not impose tariﬀs on the numeraire good
which may be traded internationally to balance the trade. Tariﬀ revenue is redistributed
equally to domestic consumers.
2.2 Consumer Demands


















where q : [0,1] → <+ is an integrable consumption function, and q0 denotes the consump-
tion level of the numeraire good.15 The second last term represents the substitutability








0 q(ω)q(ω0)dω0dω. Letting y denote the consumer’s income, the budget constraint can be
14In our simple model, country i’s optimal tariﬀ rates, for example, are the same across all commodities
imported from country j.
15This utility function is a continuous-goods version of the ones of Shubik (1984) and Yi (1996, 2000)
who analyze the case where there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerentiated commodities. Our continuum of





˜ p(ω)q(ω)dω + q0, (2)
where ˜ p : [0,1] → <+ denotes the consumer price function. The ﬁrst order condition for the
consumer’s maximization problem gives us the inverse demand function for each good ω:
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2.3 Equilibrium in Country i
Letting pi(ω) and ˜ P i denote the producer price for commodity ω sold in country i, and the
average consumer price in country i, respectively, a representative consumer’s demands in














(α − ˜ P
i). (3)
The ﬁrm ω in country j chooses {pi(ω)}n
i=1 in order to maximize its proﬁts π(ω) =
Pn
i=1 µipi(ω)qi(ω).

















for any i. Notice that pi(ω) does not vary with ω. Prices charged by ﬁrms depend only on
the import country’s tariﬀ policies. For simplicity, we henceforth suppress the argument ω.



























where ¯ ti ≡
Pn
j=1 sjti










8Substituting (5) into (4) yields the equilibrium producer price that each ﬁrm in country j



















Then it follows from (3) that a representative consumer’s demand in country i for a com-



















j(ti) holds for any tariﬀ vector ti.
2.4 Social Welfare

































A representative consumer’s income in country i is the sum of labor income, redistributed
tariﬀ revenue, and the proﬁt shares of the ﬁrms in country i:





Then it follows from (2) that
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where qi(ω) = qi
k(ti) if ω is produced in country k.
Substituting this equilibrium demand into (1) and letting qi(ti) represent country i’s
equilibrium consumption function under the tariﬀ ti, i.e., qi(ti) = (qi
j(ti))j∈N, we obtain a
9representative consumer’s utility in country i as a function of the world tariﬀ vector, which

































































with t−i = (t1,···,ti−1,ti+1,···,tn). The functions V i(ti), Mi(ti), and Xi(t−i) represent
a consumer’s gross utility, (industrial) import payments, and (industrial) export proﬁts,
respectively. Country i’s social welfare consists of a consumer’s gross utility V i(ti) and the
per-capita industrial trade surplus Xi(t−i) − Mi(ti). Country i’s tariﬀs aﬀect social welfare
through the eﬀects on V i(ti) and Mi(ti). Other countries’ tariﬀs also aﬀect country i’s social
welfare through the eﬀect on Xi(t−i).
Now, we examine the eﬀects of tariﬀ changes on the three components of social welfare:
V i(ti), Xi(t−i), and Mi(ti). We notice from (11)-(13) that an increase in a tariﬀ rate aﬀects
these components only through the changes in consumption of industrial commodities. We
see from (6) that the consumption of an industrial commodity depends on the tariﬀ rate
imposed on that commodity and the average tariﬀ rate, i.e., qi
k(ti) ≡ ˜ qi
k(ti
k,¯ ti). Thus, we
can write, for example, V i(ti) = ˜ V i(˜ qi
1(ti
1,¯ ti),··· ˜ qi
n(ti
n,¯ ti)). An increase in ti
j does not only
aﬀect qi
j directly, but also aﬀects qi
k indirectly, for all k = 1,2,···,n. These changes in

























An increase in another country’s tariﬀ rate on country i’s commodity aﬀects the export
proﬁts Xi(t−i) in a similar fashion. We can easily obtain the following lemma that shows
the eﬀects of raising a tariﬀ rate on the three components of social welfare. The proof is
straightforward and hence omitted.
Lemma 1 The ﬁrst order eﬀects of raising ti























































































It may appear that an increase in a tariﬀ rate of country i, say ti
j, necessarily decreases the
domestic consumer’s gross utility V i. Each consumer in country i reduces the consumption
of country j’s commodities as a consequence, which is detrimental. However, each agent
consumes other commodities more than before, which tends to increase the consumer’s gross
utility. The latter indirect eﬀect may outweigh the former so that an increase in a tariﬀ
rate may increase the domestic consumer’s gross utility, if the industrial commodities are
highly substitutable among themselves. Similarly, an increase in a tariﬀ rate may not always
decrease the import payments. If the industrial commodities are highly substitutable, the
resulting decrease in qi
j may be outweighed by increases in qi
k for k 6= i,j. However, it is easy
to see from Lemma 1 that an increase in another country’s tariﬀ unambiguously decreases
the domestic proﬁts obtained from the export to that country. The next section discusses
the eﬀects of a tariﬀ change on the three components of social welfare in more detail.
Now, let us derive the optimal tariﬀs. Country i’s optimal tariﬀ maximizes V i(ti)−Mi(ti)
since Xi(t−i) does not depend on ti. Let Ci = {j ∈ N|ti
j = 0} represent the set of countries
that produce commodities on which country i does not impose tariﬀs. (Notice that Ci
includes country i itself since ti
i = 0.) We consider here the situation in which country i has
signed FTAs, rather than CUs, with all other countries in Ci. Therefore, country i chooses
its external tariﬀs without any coordination with other countries in Ci. As the following
lemma shows, a country’s optimal tariﬀ rates only depend on its own characteristics due to
the separability of a consumer’s utility function.16
Lemma 2 Country i’s optimal tariﬀ rate τi is a function of si, sCi(≡
P
k∈Ci sk), and pa-






3(2β + δ)2 − δ(1 − sCi)[4(2β + δ) − δ(1 − 2si)]
> 0,
which is increasing in si, and decreasing in sCi. Thus, a country of size si has the highest
optimal tariﬀ rate when sCi = si, or Ci = {i}, and a more industrialized country, whose si
tends to be high, has a higher optimal tariﬀ rate for a given sCi.
16Somewhat surprisingly, they do not depend on country i’s own market size µi. It is because the market
size is only related to the scale eﬀect.
113 Free Trade Agreements
3.1 Incentives to sign an FTA
Let us consider an FTA between countries i and j, such that they eliminate all tariﬀs imposed
on commodities imported from each other, while they keep all other tariﬀs at their original
levels. For an FTA to be signed, both countries i and j must beneﬁt from the agreement.
















−j;t−{i,j}) ≤ W j(0,t
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−i;0,ti













where ∆V i(ti) ≡ V i(0,ti
−j) − V i(ti), ∆Xi(t−i) ≡ Xi(0,t
j
−i;t−{i,j}) − Xi(tj;t−{i,j}), and
∆Mi(ti) ≡ Mi(0,ti
−j)−Mi(ti). As we will see shortly, a tariﬀ reduction is likely to increase
a consumer’s gross utility, unless the industrial commodities are highly substitutable. Since
the FTA increases the country’s export proﬁts and is also likely to increase the import
payments, on the other hand, the FTA has an ambiguous impact on country i’s industrial
trade surplus. We assume for simplicity that each country i imposes the same external tariﬀ
rate, which is denoted by ti, on all commodities imported from countries outside of Ci.
First, let us investigate the sign of ∆V i(ti). The next lemma shows that an FTA increases
a consumer’s gross utility either if the substitutability among the industrial commodities is
low or if the original tariﬀ rate is small.
Lemma 3 A bilateral FTA increases a consumer’s gross utility, i.e., ∆V i(ti) > 0, if either
one of the following conditions is satisﬁed:







δ2(1 − 2sCi − sj) − 4β(β + δ)
.
In particular, in the case where si = 1/n for any i and the original tariﬀ rate does not
exceed the optimal tariﬀ rate that is obtained when i does not have any FTA (Ci = {i}), i.e.,
τ(n) ≡ τi(1/n,1/n;α,β,δ), it is suﬃcient that δ ≤ 10β for condition (ii) to be satisﬁed.
Remark 1 Note that condition (i) is satisﬁed if 1−2sCi−sj ≤ 0, or equivalently sCi+ 1
2sj ≥
1
2. This corresponds to the second best eﬀect: In an economy with distortions, partial removal
12of tax distortions may reduce eﬃciency (see Dixit, 1975, and Hatta, 1977). When a tariﬀ
on a commodity is eliminated, distortions between this commodity and untaxed commodities
shrink, whereas distortions with taxed commodities expand. Thus, if there are more untaxed
commodities than taxed commodities, the second best theory tells us that a bilateral FTA
between i and j is likely to raise a consumer’s gross utility. The condition sCi + 1
2sj ≥ 1
2
matches exactly to this observation. Turning to condition (ii), the right-hand side is positive
only when sCi + 1
2sj < 1
2. Thus, condition (ii) is meaningful only when (i) is not satisﬁed,
and it shows that the detrimental second best eﬀect is negligible if the rate of the tariﬀs,
which cause distortions in the ﬁrst place, is small.
Next, we turn to investigating the eﬀect of an FTA between countries i and j on the
industrial trade surplus. Let Mi
k and Xi
k be country i’s (per capita) import payments to
















































An FTA between i and j only involves changes in ti and tj so that it does not aﬀect Xi
k(tk)




































The third country eﬀect, represented by the terms in the parentheses, is always positive since
the reduction of ti
j makes commodities imported from country j relatively less expensive, and
hence country i’s imports from third countries decrease, i.e., ∆Mi
k(ti) < 0. Although the
third country eﬀect works positively for countries i and j, it implies that the FTA between
them hurts all other countries.
Having shown that the third country eﬀect is positive, let us now investigate the direct
surplus eﬀect, which can be rewritten as follows from the deﬁnitions of M
j






























13where θi = si/µi as deﬁned above. The higher θi and the lower θj, the larger an increase in
country i’s industrial trade surplus. That is, other things being equal, the relatively more
industrialized country is more enthusiastic than the less industrialized country in signing a
bilateral FTA. The more industrialized country derives a large beneﬁt from the opening of
the partner’s relatively large market. In addition, opening its own market to the partner’s
ﬁrms does not signiﬁcantly increase import payments since the resulting penetration by the
partner’s ﬁrms is relatively small. Another important factor that aﬀects the incentives to




i(tj). Country i’s export to country j increases more than its
import from country j, and hence the FTA between i and j tends to be more beneﬁcial to
country i.
3.2 Stable Free Trade Networks
An FTA that involves more than two countries can be considered as a collection of bilateral
FTAs between member countries, so it is convenient to describe FTAs in terms of graph
theory terminologies. An FTA between countries i and j is described by a link, which is an
unordered pair of two countries. An FTA graph is a nondirected graph, (N,Γ), consisting
of the set of countries N and a (free trade) network Γ that is a collection of links. The set
of country i’s FTA partners in a network Γ is Ci(Γ) = {i} ∪ {k ∈ N : (i,k) ∈ Γ}, which
includes i, as we have already described. We continue to write it as Ci without confusion, if
a network Γ is ﬁxed.
If tariﬀ rates are exogenously determined, or if they are determined uniquely for each
free trade network Γ (such as in the case where all countries set their individual optimal
tariﬀs given the prevailing network Γ), then country i’s payoﬀ (social welfare) can be written
uniquely by ui(Γ). The set of countries N and their payoﬀ functions deﬁne a network
formation game.
Network formation games are ﬁrst studied by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A pairwise
stable network is a network Γ∗ such that (i) for any (i,j) ∈ Γ∗, ui(Γ∗) ≥ ui(Γ∗\(i,j)) and
uj(Γ∗) ≥ uj(Γ∗\(i,j)), i.e., for any pair of linked countries, neither country has an incentive
to cut the link, and (ii) for any (i,j) / ∈ Γ∗ with i 6= j, if ui(Γ∗) < ui(Γ∗ ∪ (i,j)) then
uj(Γ∗) > uj(Γ∗ ∪(i,j)), i.e., for any pair of non-linked countries, at least one of them has no
14incentive to form a link with the other.17
We are particularly interested in the situation where the entire world is involved in a
large FTA, i.e., the world attains global free trade. This situation can also be described by a
graph theory terminology. A complete graph is a graph (N,Γcomp) that contains all possible
links, i.e., for any i,j ∈ N with i 6= j, (i,j) ∈ Γcomp. We call Γcomp a complete network. The
global free trade is a complete graph of the free trade network formation game.
3.3 Symmetric Countries
We say that countries i and j are symmetric if si = sj and µi = µj. This subsection considers
the case in which the world consists of n symmetric countries so that si = µi = 1/n for any








































































The current network structure aﬀects the impact of the FTA between i and j on country
i’s industrial trade surplus through its eﬀects on commodity demands. Especially important
are the size of Ci and the size of Cj.
Let us say that countries i and j are completely symmetric if they are symmetric and
|Ci| = |Cj|. If the original tariﬀs are the same between completely symmetric countries i and
j, i.e., ti = tj = t, then ¯ ti = ¯ tj and q
j
i(tj) = qi




Thus, the direct surplus eﬀect disappears if countries i and j are completely symmetric and
their original tariﬀs are the same at t. An increase in country i’s export to country j and an
increase in country i’s import from county j are completely canceled out. On the other hand,
17Readers may be tempted to formulate a strategic form game such that each player (country) announces
the names of players with whom she wants to be linked, and a link is formed if and only if both sides of
the link announce each other’s names. In such a game, however, there would be too many Nash equilibria,
always including the one without any link. It is because a player has no incentive to announce the name of
the player who does not announce her name. See Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) for the coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium, a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium in such games.
15the third country eﬀect is nonnegative (if n ≥ 3). Thus, we have ∆[Xi(t−i) − Mi(ti)] ≥ 0
if countries i and j are completely symmetric.
Therefore, completely symmetric countries always have incentives to sign an FTA as long
as one of the conditions in Lemma 3 is satisﬁed. One important case is that all pairs but
(i,j) have already formed free trade links. Since most tariﬀs are already eliminated, an
FTA between i and j reduces distortions (condition (i) of Lemma 3), and hence enhances a
consumer’s gross utility in these countries (∆V i > 0). Thus, the two countries can improve
social welfare by signing an FTA, which leads to our ﬁrst proposition.18
Proposition 1 Suppose that there are n symmetric countries in the world, and that their
external tariﬀ rates are the same if they are imposed. Then, global free trade (a complete
network Γcomp) is a stable network.
Proof. If all pairs but (i,j) have already formed free trade links, i.e., the free trade network
is Γcomp\(i,j), then countries i and j are completely symmetric. As a result, we know from
the above observation that each country’s industrial trade surplus does not decrease by
signing an FTA. Moreover, since sCi = 1− 1
n and sj = 1/n, and similarly for country j, when
the free trade network is Γcomp\(i,j), we have sCi + 1
2sj = 1− 1
2n > 1/2 for all n ≥ 2. Then,
it follows from Lemma 3 and Remark 1 that a consumer’s gross utility in countries i and j







implying that Γcomp is a stable network.
Q.E.D.
Remark 2 Note that this proposition holds even if we assume that each country adjusts
its tariﬀ rate optimally according to the current free trade network. Starting at the com-
plete graph, if a pair of countries cut their FTA, they would impose the same tariﬀ rates
18Bagwell and Staiger (1999) argue that reciprocal trade liberalization between two countries is beneﬁcial
to both countries since it leaves each country’s terms of trade unchanged so that it eliminates negative
terms-of-trade externalities. An FTA between two completely symmetric countries ﬁts their argument in
that it leaves the bilateral (industrial commodity) terms of trade unaﬀected. In addition, each country’s
bilateral terms of trade against a third country improves as qi
k(ti) and hence pi
k(ti) decline for k 6= i,j.
16τi(1/n,(n−1)/n;α,β,δ) by symmetry. Thus, the assumptions of Proposition 1 are satisﬁed
even if tariﬀ rates are endogenously determined.
A natural question now is whether or not the complete graph is a unique stable network.
Unfortunately, it is not the case in general. If q
j




i(tj) is signiﬁcantly smaller than ∆qi
j(ti), the direct surplus eﬀect for country i is
negative and it may outweigh the third country eﬀect. This situation arises when country
j has many FTAs with other countries, while country i has a small number of FTAs as the
following numerical example illustrates. As a benchmark, we set each country’s tariﬀ rate
at τ(n), the optimal level without FTAs.
Example 1 Suppose that countries are symmetric, n = 12 and δ = 12β. Suppose further
that ti = τ(n) for any i ∈ N. In this case, graph Γ−1 = {(j,k) : j,k 6= 1} (country 1 does not
have any FTA, while all other countries have FTAs with one another) is pairwise stable. The
reason why Γ−1 is stable is that the isolated country 1 does not have an incentive to make a
bilateral FTA with any other country, although each of other countries has an incentive to
sign a bilateral FTA with country 1.
If δ is large, as in the above example, consumer demands are price sensitive. In the
absence of an FTA, therefore, country 1 does not import much of industrial commodities,
and most of industrial commodities consumed are domestically produced. However, once
country 1 signs an FTA with country 2, say, much of (about a half of) the consumption
of domestic commodities is substituted by those produced in country 2 so that country 1
experiences a dramatic increase in its import payments. In contrast, country 2 has already
opened its market to all but country 1 before the FTA. Therefore, the FTA with country 1
does not increase its import much even if δ is large. Therefore, the direct surplus eﬀect of
country 1 is negative and is large in its magnitude, which outweighs the third country eﬀect
and the eﬀect on ∆V i(ti) in Example 1.
In the following, we seek a condition under which every pair of countries has incentives
to form an FTA regardless of their existing FTAs. In such a case, it is obvious that the
complete graph (global free trade) becomes the unique stable network.
Lemma 4 Suppose that countries i and j are symmetric and that the external tariﬀs are
the same, i.e., ti = tj = t. Then, regardless of free trade networks of these two countries
17with the rest of the world, ∆(Xi − Mi) > 0 holds if the following condition is satisﬁed.
t ≤
2αβ
4β + (1 + 1
n)δ
If the optimal tariﬀ rate, derived in Lemma 2, is smaller than
2αβ
4β+(1+ 1
n)δ, we can conclude
that a bilateral FTA between i and j increases the industrial trade surplus for these countries
regardless of the network structure, under the mild condition that their external tariﬀs are
not greater than their individual optimal tariﬀs. The next proposition states that it is indeed
the case if the industrial commodities are not highly substitutable.
Proposition 2 Suppose that there are n symmetric countries in the world, and that their
external tariﬀ rates are the same at t that is not greater than the optimal tariﬀ rate without
any FTA, i.e., t ≤ τ(n). Suppose further that δ ≤ 6β. Then, under any network Γ, any pair
of countries i and j without a bilateral FTA has incentives to form a free trade link. As a
result, global free trade (a complete network Γcomp) is the unique stable network.
The signiﬁcance of this proposition is that it applies regardless of these two countries’
existing FTAs. Consider the case where there exist several FTAs, possibly diﬀerent in size.
If the industrial commodities are not highly substitutable among themselves, any pair of
countries from diﬀerent FTAs has incentives to form a new FTA. As far as trading blocs
take the form of FTAs, as opposed to CUs, they are likely to be “building blocs” rather
than “stumbling blocs” towards global free trade if countries are symmetric. Moreover,
Proposition 2 suggests that if countries myopically make decisions as to whether or not
they have FTAs with other countries, the world free trade network will eventually reach the
complete network such that global free trade is eﬀectively attained.
3.4 Asymmetric Countries
Now, let us turn to a more realistic case in which countries are asymmetric. Unfortunately,
it is diﬃcult to obtain any analytical result in a general setting. Thus, in this subsection, we
assume δ = 0 in order to simplify the analysis. This simpliﬁcation is deﬁnitely restrictive,
since it makes demands for industrial commodities completely independent of one another,
and hence the third country eﬀects vanish and the existing FTA network becomes irrelevant
for each country’s incentive to sign a new FTA. Despite of these restrictions, it is a conve-
nient assumption for illustrating how the asymmetry of countries aﬀect the FTA network
18formation. It follows from Lemma 2 that the optimal tariﬀ rate is constant for any country i,
irrespective of si, µi, and Ci. Therefore, we can naturally assume that each country imposes
the optimal tariﬀ rate, t = α
3 as its external tariﬀ.
In this special case of no substitution among industrial commodities, we can easily cal-
culate social welfare of each country. Since commodity demands are independent of one
another when δ = 0, the main part of a consumer’s gross utility can be written as a simple
sum of utilities derived from the consumption of all individual commodities. Let p(t) and
q(t) denote the equilibrium producer price and quantity of the industrial commodity that
is faced with the tariﬀ rate t, and let v(t) denote a consumer’s utility derived from the








































As Figure 1 shows, we have p(t) = (α − t)/2 and q(t) = (α − t)/2β, and hence v(α/3) =
5α2/(18β), p(α/3)q(α/3) = α2/(9β), v(0) = 3α2/(8β), and p(0)q(0) = α2/(4β). Thus, social














































If countries i and j sign an FTA, then Ci expands to include j. Thus, the impact on















































The ﬁrst term in the brackets corresponds to ∆V i, which is always positive (see Lemma 3
and Remark 1), and the latter corresponds to the direct surplus eﬀect, ∆Xi
j − ∆Mi
j. As
we have discussed in Section 3.1, the direct surplus eﬀect depends on the two countries’











Country i has an incentive to sign an FTA with country j if and only if θj does not exceed
10/3 times θi. This implies that two countries sign an FTA if their industrialization levels are
not very diﬀerent. The following proposition is an immediate consequence of this observation.
Proposition 3 Suppose that δ = 0 and that countries impose the optimal tariﬀ rate t = α/3
as their external tariﬀs. Then, countries i and j form a link if θi ≤ 10
3 θj and θj ≤ 10
3 θi. The
stable network is a collection of all links, each of which connects such a pair of countries,
and is generically unique.
This proposition gives us an interesting prediction. Suppose that there are two groups of
countries: one is a group of developed countries with similar and high industrialization levels,
and the other is a group of less developed countries with similar and low industrialization
levels. Suppose also that the industrialization level of each developed country is far greater
(more than 10/3 times) than the one of any less developed country. Then, the FTA formation
process leads to a stable network in which all countries within each group are linked with
each other, while there is no link across the two groups. The FTA formation process may end
with two (stumbling) trading blocs if industrialization levels of two groups are very diﬀerent
from each other.
4 Free Trade Agreement vs. Customs Union
This section investigates the diﬀerence in member countries’ incentives to sign a new FTA
emphasizing the fact that a CU requires all members’ consent when a member country wants
to have a free trade link with an outside country. Our main goal of the paper is to assess
how far the process of PTAs continues and whether or not global free trade is eﬀectively
attained as a complete world-wide web of PTAs. The analysis in this section may possibly
tell us which form of PTAs, CU or FTA, should be encouraged for the purpose of facilitating
more PTAs in the world. In order to focus on the issue, we assume that external tariﬀ rates
are ﬁxed and the same in both cases.
First, we examine incentives for country i having engaged free trade with other countries
in Ci to have a new free trade link with country j / ∈ Ci, and compare the incentives between
20two cases: the case where Ci forms a CU and the case where Ci is a regional FTA such
that every pair of countries in Ci has a bilateral FTA. Let us begin with investigating the
impact on a consumer’s gross utility V i. As we have seen in Section 3.1, the impact on V i is
ambiguous in both cases. However, these eﬀects are exactly the same between the two cases,
since V i only depends on ti and changes in ti are the same between the two cases. Thus, the
diﬀerence in changes of the industrial trade surplus between these two cases will determine
whether or not country i’s incentive to have an FTA with country j is higher in the case
where Ci is a CU rather than a regional FTA. Here, we decompose the third country eﬀect






































where country k is a representative partner of i, i.e., k ∈ Ci\{i}, and country h is a represen-
tative outsider of i, i.e., h / ∈ Ci ∪ {j}. Table 1 depicts the signs of the eﬀects, and compares
these two cases item by item.
FTA CU
∆V i ? = ?
∆Mi
j + = +
∆Xi
j + > +
∆Mi
k − = −
∆Xi
k 0 > −
∆Mi
h − = −
∆Xi
h 0 = 0
Table 1. FTA vs. CU
We start with Mi
j, country i’s import payments to country j. Since country i’s import is
solely determined by ti and country i’s post-FTA tariﬀ vectors are the same between the two
cases, the eﬀects are exactly the same. This eﬀect is positive since country i lowers its tariﬀ
rate for commodities imported from country j. In contrast, the eﬀects on Xi
j = Xi
j(tj) are
diﬀerent especially when |Ci\{i}| is large. It is because country j eliminates tariﬀs against
all countries in Ci in the case of CU while it eliminates tariﬀs only for commodities imported
from country i in the case of FTA. Since industrial commodities are substitutable among
21themselves, it is obvious that an increase in Xi
j is smaller in the case of CU. Consequently,
the direct surplus eﬀect is lower in the case of CU than in the case of FTA.
Next, we investigate the eﬀects on country i’s industrial trade surplus with a member
country k ∈ Ci\{i}. As before, the eﬀects on Mi
k = Mi
k(ti) are the same in both cases.
However, the eﬀects on Xi
k = Xi
k(tk) are diﬀerent again. In the case of FTA, tk is unaﬀected
and hence Xi
k does not change. In the case of CU, on the other hand, country k also
eliminates tariﬀs against country j, and country i’s export to country k is reduced due to
the substitution eﬀect. Country i’s industrial trade surplus with a member country k is
again lower in the case of CU. Finally, it is easy to see that the third country eﬀect with
nonmembers is the same in both cases. Import payments from country h decreases by the
same amount due to the tariﬀ reductions for commodities imported from country j, and
country i’s export to country h stays the same in both cases since tk is not aﬀected.
We have shown that the impacts of a new FTA on consumer’s gross utility are the same
between the two cases, but the eﬀect on the industrial trade surplus is unambiguously lower
in the case of CU. We record this result as a lemma.
Lemma 5 Country i has less incentive to have an FTA with country j / ∈ Ci when Ci forms
a CU rather than a regional FTA (or the case where country i has bilateral FTAs with other
countries in Ci), unless the industrial commodities are independent of one another, i.e.,
δ = 0, in which case the incentives are the same.
Whether or not country i’s incentive to have a free trade link with country j is lower
when Cj forms a CU rather than a regional FTA is generally ambiguous, however. The
diﬀerence between these two cases in our terminology is that country i adds only one link
with country j in the case of regional FTAs, whereas in the case of CU country i adds
|Cj| links simultaneously with all individual countries in Cj. The latter case is eﬀectively
equivalent to the case where country i has an FTA with an integrated economy that consists
of all countries in Cj. Whether country i prefers having an FTA with country j alone or
with the whole Cj depends on the relative characteristics of j and Cj.
However, we can make a strong statement in the symmetric country case with a low
substitution parameter δ. Proposition 2 indicates that if all countries are symmetric, and δ is
not very high, country i has an incentive to have an FTA with any country, in particular with
country j alone or with an integrated economy consisting of all countries in Cj. Therefore,
country i wants to have an FTA with country j whether Cj forms a CU or an FTA. Combining
22this observation together with Lemma 5, we ﬁnd that two countries are less likely to have an
FTA if either of them is a member of a CU in such a situation. Indeed, global free trade is
the unique stable network if all PTAs take a form of FTA (Proposition 2), whereas several
CUs of asymmetric size may co-exist in a stable network if all FTAs take a form of CU.19
Proposition 4 An FTA is less likely to be signed if a country involved is a member of a
CU rather than a regional FTA if all countries are symmetric, imposing the same external
tariﬀ rate, and δ ≤ 6β, i.e., the industrial commodities are not highly substitutable among
themselves.
If countries are not symmetric, CUs can facilitate global trade liberalization more than
FTAs. Consider again the asymmetric country case with δ = 0. Let us order n asymmetric
countries according to their industrialization levels such that θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ ··· ≥ θn. We know
from Proposition 3 that if θ1 > 10
3 θn, countries 1 and n will not sign an FTA, and the
process of bilateral FTA formation will never reach global free trade. However, if all FTAs
take a form of CU, the process of CU formation may reach global free trade. Let us consider
a CU by C(k) ≡ {1,2,...,k}, formed by k countries with highest industrialization levels.




h∈C(k) µh, is the
“average” industrialization level of all individual members of C(k), so that θ1 ≥ θC(k) ≥ θk.
Now, it follows from Proposition 3 that C(k) and k +1 sign an FTA, or in other words, CU
by C(k) expands to include k + 1, if θC(k) ≤ 10
3 θk+1. Notice that this inequality can hold
even if θ1 > 10
3 θk+1. The CU formation averages out member countries’ industrialization
levels, and hence encourages a less industrialized country to join the group. In particular,
if θC(k) ≤ 10
3 θk+1 for any k = 1,···,n − 1, CUs serve as “building blocs” and the process of
CU formation will reach global free trade.20
19Employing a coalition bargaining game (see Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999)), Yi (1996) shows
that in equilibrium, two CUs of diﬀerent size are formed when the world consists of a reasonable number
of symmetric countries. We can conduct the same exercise in our model and obtain qualitatively the same
result. Suppose that countries are symmetric, n = 50 and δ = 5β. Suppose further that each country
sets its external tariﬀ rate at τ(n), the optimal level without any PTA. (Proposition 2 suggests that in this
case, a unique stable network in the FTA regime is the complete graph Γcomp.) Then, two CUs {43,7}
are formed in equilibrium. The ﬁrst proposer calls 43 countries to form a coalition, which is accepted by
all countries involved. Then a country outside of this coalition calls all other remaining countries to form
another coalition, which is also accepted by those countries.
20We should note that history of CU expansion may matter. It is possible for the CU expansion to stop
prematurely if two unions, one by developed countries and the other by less developed countries, are formed,
and the diﬀerence in the industrialization levels of these two unions is quite large.
235 Concluding Remarks
We have introduced a general analytical framework that is suitable for the investigation of
PTAs and shown how countries’ incentives vary with the country size, industrialization level,
substitutability among industrial commodities, etc. We have found that if all countries are
symmetric, a complete global free trade network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable
network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable among themselves. We have
also compared FTAs and CUs as to which of these two regimes facilitates PTA formation.
We have shown that in the symmetric country case where industrial commodities are not
highly substitutable, countries are likely to have less incentives to have a new FTA if one of
the countries is a member of a CU rather than an FTA. If countries are asymmetric, however,
the CU formation averages out member countries’ industrialization levels, which may help
further CU formation.
We must note that Propositions 2 and 4 are obtained under the assumption that external
tariﬀs are ﬁxed when countries form FTAs. Since Lemma 2 implies that a country’s optimal
tariﬀs decrease as the country have more free trade links, countries would lower their external
tariﬀs as they form more free trade links. Indeed, countries’ incentives to have an FTA are
aﬀected by this tariﬀ adjustment. We have assumed that external tariﬀ rates are exogenously
ﬁxed, since it is necessary to simplify the model for analyzing various forms of complicated
FTA networks. Moreover, it is far from obvious that in reality, countries optimally adjust
external tariﬀs every time when they sign a new FTA. Of course, it is interesting to know how
these tariﬀ adjustments aﬀect countries’ incentives to form PTAs. We leave this extension
for future research.21
21Our primitive numerical analysis in the case of n symmetric countries shows that even if the optimal
tariﬀs are constantly adjusted in the process of free trade network formation, a variant of Proposition 2
holds: Social welfare of each side of a new bilateral free trade agreement improves under any ongoing free
trade networks, if δ is not very high and n is reasonably large.
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By substituting this result and (6) into ∂V i/∂ti
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δ2









Let t(γ) denote the bilateral tariﬀ reform schedule between countries i and j. This schedule
satisﬁes ti
j(γ) = (1 − γ)ti and t
j
i(γ) = (1 − γ)tj, where γ ∈ [0,1] and hence ti
j(0) = ti
and ti
j(1) = 0, for example. All other tariﬀ rates are kept unchanged, i.e., ti
k(γ) = ti and
t
j
k(γ) = tj for any k where k 6= i,j. Notice that ¯ ti also changes in the course of tariﬀ reform
such that ¯ ti(γ) =
P
k/ ∈Ci∪{j} skti + sj(1 − γ)ti = (1 − sCi − γsj)ti, and similarly for ¯ tj(γ). By
substituting ¯ ti(γ) and ti
j(γ) for ¯ ti and ti
j, respectively, and using dti
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The suﬃcient condition (i) immediately follows.
Let us suppose now that the condition (i) does not hold so that the terms in the square
brackets of the last equation in the above are negative. Then the condition (ii) also follows
immediately.
In order to derive the suﬃcient condition δ ≤ 10β for (ii), we consider the case where
sk = 1/n for any k. Since the original tariﬀ rate ti is less than or equal to the optimal tariﬀ
τi, we need only show that if δ ≤ 10β condition (ii) holds when ti = τi.
25Now, ∆V i > 0 if and only if
8αβ2
δ2(1 − 2sCi − sj) − 4β(β + δ)
> t
i. (16)
Recall that we only consider the case where the denominator of the left-hand side is positive.
As Lemma 2 shows, the optimal tariﬀ decreases in sCi. To derive the condition under which
(ii) holds for any sCi, therefore, we substitute si = 1/n, which is the smallest sCi, for sCi.





3(2β + δ)2 − δ(1 − 1
n)[4(2β + δ) − δ(1 − 2
n)]
.
Noticing that the left-hand side of (16) decreases by substituting si for sCi, the inequality
that we need to verify can be written as
8αβ2
δ2(1 − 3
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where ˆ β = β/(β +δ) and ˆ δ = δ/(β +δ). To simplify the expressions, we let x = 1/n. Then,
it follows from ˆ δ = 1 − ˆ β that the above inequality holds if the following function takes a
nonnegative value for any x ∈ (0,1/2] and any ˆ β ∈ [0,1].
g(x, ˆ β) ≡ 28ˆ β
3 + (12 + 20x)ˆ β
2(1 − ˆ β) − (1 − 9x − 4x
2)ˆ β(1 − ˆ β)
2 − (x − 3x
2)(1 − ˆ β)
3
= (1 − ˆ β)
2(3 + ˆ β)x
2 + (1 − ˆ β)(10ˆ β
2 + 11ˆ β − 1)x + ˆ β(ˆ β + 1)(15ˆ β − 1).
It follows immediately that if ˆ β ≥ 1
15, then g(0, ˆ β) ≥ 0. Moreover, we have
∂g
∂x
(x, ˆ β) = 2(1 − ˆ β)
2(3 + ˆ β)x + (1 − ˆ β)(10ˆ β
2 + 11ˆ β − 1),
which is increasing in x. Evaluating this derivative at x = 0, we obtain
∂g
∂x
(0, ˆ β) = (1 − ˆ β)(10ˆ β
2 + 11ˆ β − 1).
26Thus, ∂g/∂x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ (0,1/2] if ˆ β ≥ −11+
√
161
20 , which in turn holds if ˆ β ≥ 1/11.
Together with the fact that g(0, ˆ β) ≥ 0 if ˆ β ≥ 1
15, it implies that g(x,β) ≥ 0 for any
x ∈ (0,1/2] and for any ˆ β ∈ [0,1] if ˆ β ≥ 1/11, or equivalently, δ ≤ 10β.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 the deﬁnition of the bilateral tariﬀ
reform schedule between countries i and j, denoted by t(γ) where ti
j(γ) = (1 − γ)t and




n)t, and similarly for j, while tk(γ) = tk for any k 6= i,j,
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The contents in the curly brackets is nonnegative for any γ if and only if
t ≤
2αβ











Indeed, they are strictly positive under this condition, except at γ = 1 in which case they
becomes zero. Therefore, ∆[Xi(t−i) − Mi(ti)] > 0 if this condition is satisﬁed.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. If n = 2, then si = sj = 1
2, and hence the industrial trade surplus
does not change. Then, it follows from Lemma 3 that if δ ≤ 10β, countries i and j have
incentives to sign an FTA.
If n ≥ 3, on the other hand, the upper bound for t in Lemma 4 becomes important. As
Lemma 2 shows, the optimal tariﬀ is highest when a country does not have any FTA, i.e.,
sCi = si. Thus, in the case of n (≥ 3) symmetric countries, the optimal tariﬀ rate under any
cooperation structures is bounded above by τ(n). Now, let us examine how τ(n) varies with
n. To see this, we deﬁne the function τ∗ by τ∗(si) = τ(1/si), keeping in mind that n = 1/si
for any i when all countries are completely symmetric. Then, τ(n) ≤ τ(3) for any n ≥ 3 if
and only if τ∗(si) ≤ τ∗(1/3) for any si ≤ 1/3.
Since τ∗(si) = τi(si,si;α,β,δ) for a given set of α, β, and δ, we have dτ∗/dsi = ∂τi/∂si+













= 4αβδ{3(2β + δ)
2 −
h
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i) = 3(2β + δ)
2 −
h






Now, we show that if δ ≤ 9β, then A(si) > 0 and B(si) > 0 for any si ∈ [0,1/3], which
implies that τ∗ is increasing on [0,1/3]. First, it is easy to see that A(0) > 0 and dA/dsi =
−4βδ − 4siδ2 < 0. We can also see A(1
3) = 1
9(36β2 + 15βδ − 2δ2) > 0 if δ ≤ (15 +
√
513)/4,
which in turn is satisﬁed if δ ≤ 9β. Thus, A(si) > 0 on [0,1/3] if δ ≤ 9β. Turning to B(si),
it is also easy to see that B(0) = 4β(3β + δ) > 0 and
dB





= 8βδ + δ
2(1 + 4s
i) > 0.
Thus, we have B(si) > 0 for any si ∈ [0,1/3].
We have found that dτ∗/dsi is positive for any si ∈ (0,1/3] so that τ∗ takes the largest
value at si = 1/3. Thus, if δ ≤ 9β, then τ∗(si) ≤ τ∗(1/3) for any si ≤ 1/3 and hence
τ(n) ≤ τ(3) for any n ≥ 3.







3(2β + δ)2 −








108β2 + 60βδ + 5δ2.
Since 2αβ/[4β + (1 + 1
n)δ] is increasing in n, we need only show τ(3) ≤ 2αβ/[4β + (1 + 1
3)δ]






2(3β + δ)(108β2 + 60βδ + 5δ2)
(6β − δ)(2β + δ).
This value is nonnegative if and only if δ ≤ 6β. Thus, as long as δ ≤ 6β (as we have seen
before, δ ≤ 9β guarantees that τ(n) is decreasing in n for n ≥ 3), the condition in Lemma 4
is satisﬁed when n ≥ 3. Moreover, if δ ≤ 6β, then δ ≤ 10β is also satisﬁed, so that Lemma 2
implies that a consumer’s gross utility increases by the FTA. Consequently, countries i and
j have incentives to have an FTA if δ ≤ 6β.
Q.E.D.
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